The Bridge from Laissez-Faire to Socialism

Cronyism remains unchecked in the world’s largest economy.

We might object to the phrase crony capitalism for two reasons:

First, because cronyism is in some ways the antithesis of capitalism. The freedom to compete and the freedom to fail that are central tenets of capitalism are severely compromised by cronyism when in the former case powerful politicians intervene to shield their friends in business and finance from competition, and in the latter intervene again to save them from bankruptcy or occasionally from criminal prosecution. Of course, these friends in turn are no disloyal slouches and they later show themselves to be supremely appreciative by underwriting, financially and otherwise, those same politicians who had all but guaranteed their continued dominance in normal times and their survival against bad odds in times of distress. Read more →

America Without Immigration 2015-50

Be careful what you wish for, if that is what you wish for.

Except for the oil shocks of the 1970s and a few other recessionary years, the US economy has generally been strong in the postwar era since 1945. Huge advances in technology and trade, a favorable business environment and strong demographics combined to create tens of trillions of dollars of new wealth in the US and around the world.

The demographic component played an important supporting role. During the baby boom years, the number of Americans grew at an average annualized rate of 1.6% (see chart). In subsequent years starting in the mid 1960s, this growth faded to about 1% where it remained until 2007-08. Since then, it has fallen to 0.7% and, on current UN projections, it will continue to fall through 2050 when it may dip under 0.4%. Read more →

Portfolio 019 – Manhattan Ultra-Luxury ‘Battling the Serpent of Chaos’

The deceleration of China and resulting commodities crash have created a problem for developers of ultra luxury condominiums.

The ancient Egyptians believed that the sky was a solid dome, the belly of the goddess Nut who arched her body from one side of the horizon to the other. Every day, the sun god Ra emerged in the east and sailed in his boat across the sky until dusk when he disappeared in the west by dipping below the surface of Nun, the ocean upon which the whole flat earth floated. Read more →

The Relationship Between Fertility and National Income

We all heard that “demography is destiny”. But how many of us truly believe it? If demography was destiny, the world would look very different today. The two demographic giants China and India would be uncontested economic and military powers. The United States would be a regional power struggling to keep up. Larger European nations such as Britain, France and Germany would barely register on the economic map, while smaller ones such as Switzerland and Finland would be invisible. Nigeria and DR Congo would be African powerhouses. Brazil, Indonesia and the Philippines would be the shining stars of their continents. Read more →

In One Chart: Achieving the Demographic Dividend

The experience of China provides a useful policy template for countries with booming populations in south and southeast Asia and in sub-Saharan Africa. The Chinese boom showed that a growing working-age population combined with a declining fertility ratio can result in a large demographic dividend if certain conditions are met. As noted in this recent post, two important drivers of lower fertility are an increase in female literacy and a decline in child mortality. Read more →

The Lottery of Birth Place and Time

“When I attempt to find a simple formula for the period in which I grew up, prior to the First World War, I hope that I convey its fullness by calling it the Golden Age of Security.”

Thus begins the autobiography The World of Yesterday in which the famed Austrian author Stefan Zweig, born in 1881, recounts his early life in Vienna at the height of the Belle Époque. It was a time of high culture, of prosperity, and of people who believed that war was forever relegated to the past. Then came the shock of WW1, the breakup of Austria-Hungary, the difficult inter-war period, Zweig’s own forced exile, the horrors of WW2, and finally death. Zweig and his wife committed suicide in Brazil, far from Vienna and very far from the Belle Époque, in early 1942 at a time when the Nazis still looked unbeatable.

Read more →

Portfolio 004 – Boeing vs. Airbus: Orders and Profits

Boeing has a better product lineup and is more profitable but Airbus has more room for improvement.

The rising tide of globalization has boosted growth prospects for the airline industry all over the world, and in particular in emerging markets such as China and India.  As air travel has become more accessible to hundreds of millions of people, airplane orders and deliveries have boomed. We examine the evolution of orders and profits at Boeing and Airbus.

Airbus Market Share Strategy

Given the Boeing – Airbus duopoly and buoyant demand markets, both manufacturers should now be highly profitable but this is only true of Boeing.  Airbus made some strategic decisions in the late 1990s and early 2000s that continue to depress its profitability, namely the development of the super jumbo A380 which is still loss-making, and the sale of planes below cost or at razor-thin margins in the early 2000s in a drive for market share.

If Airbus’s main mission has been to gain market share, one has to recognize that this mission has so far been highly successful.  In the year 2000, Airbus delivered 311 planes to airlines and Boeing delivered 489.  Eleven years later in 2011, Airbus delivered 534 planes and Boeing 477.  As important, the backlog at EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, the parent of Airbus), including non-Airbus divisions, grew from €132 billion in 2000, the equivalent of 5 years of revenues, to €541 billion in 2011, the equivalent of 11 years of revenues.  Boeing’s comparable backlog grew from $153 billion in 2000, 3 years of revenues, to $355 billion in 2011, 5 years of revenues.  Because the Euro has appreciated against the dollar in that decade, these figures actually underestimate the scale of the shift in favor of EADS/Airbus.  In dollar terms, EADS’s backlog has grown from $124 billion in 2000 to $700 billion in 2011, a near six-fold increase.

But Boeing has been more profitable.  In 2011, its EBIT margin in commercial planes was 9.7% vs. 1.7% at Airbus. This dichotomy between one party’s push for market share gains and the other’s focus on profitable orders has defined the relationship between the two competitors for over a decade.

In a decade of astounding revenue and order growth, Airbus has not improved its profitability.  In fact, its operating income (EBIT) was negative in three of the last six years (2006-2011) despite healthy revenues and deliveries.  Boeing has remained profitable but its commercial airplane sales and operating income have been range-bound for a decade.  From 2000 to 2011, Boeing sales grew at a small 1.4% annualized rate and EBIT at only 2.3%.  At Airbus, sales have grown at a 7.6% annual rate (11% in dollar terms) but EBIT has nosedived into the red for the past six years.  Boeing’s commercial plane division accounted for 66% of its group sales in 1999 and now accounts for 52%.  Airbus sales have remained consistently above 60% of EADS group sales and reached a new high of 67% in 2011.  Airbus’s drive for market share at the expense of profits has had a very measurable impact: its revenues are up, its profits are down, and Boeing’s airplane sales and earnings have flatlined.

EADS went public in July 2000 at €19 per share and ended 2011 near €24, a subdued performance for an 11-year period in which sales more than doubled. In January 2012, Airbus promised better returns for its shareholders for the years ahead and the share responded by rising to €31 in March (it recently traded at €28.8). EADS’s reasons for optimism are a decline of the Euro vs. the US dollar and a long-awaited improvement in operating margins for its superjumbo A380.

Prospects

Long-term headline prospects look nominally encouraging. Airbus and Boeing estimate that 25,000 to 33,500 new planes (including both passenger and cargo) will be delivered to airlines in the next twenty years.  However, according to Boeing, single-aisle aircraft (the A320 for Airbus, the 737 for Boeing, and their successors) will account for two thirds of units sold and for half of the value.  And as many as one third of new planes will be sold in the Asia-Pacific region.

As a market segment, ‘single-aisle in Asia-Pacific’ is not the ideal sweet spot for profit growth because smaller planes have lower margins and because Airbus and Boeing face new entrants in the single-aisle category, notably from China’s COMAC C919 and from Russia’s Sukhoi Superjet 100. The COMAC C919 seats 165 to 190 passengers and is therefore directly positioned against the larger versions of the A320 and the 737. It already has 175 orders, nearly all from Chinese airlines, and it plans to start deliveries in 2016.  Note in passing that Airbus is now assembling some of its own A320s in Tianjin, China, with a target production rate of four per month in 2012. It says on its web page Airbus in China that it “has several major technology transfer programmes underway” some of which have ostensibly already been filtered to COMAC.

The Superjet 100 is smaller than the C919 at 75 to 95 passengers and is positioned against the smallest versions of the A320 and 737 and against Brazil’s Embraer and Canada’s Bombardier. Although it has 240 orders, there are only eight in service now, seven of them with the Russian carrier Aeroflot. Last week’s tragic crash in Indonesia raises fresh safety concerns about Russian aviation just as it tries to rebound from its accident-prone Soviet legacy.

Turning to recent orders, we see that as of the end of April, Boeing had received 415 new plane orders in 2012 and Airbus 95. This huge lead in favor of the American is a temporary anomaly because most of it comes from orders for the new Boeing 737MAX which came on line about 12 months after the competing Airbus 320NEO.  If 2012 is the year of the MAX, 2011 was the year of the NEO with Airbus logging a commanding 1419 total orders (of which 1226 for the NEO) against 805 at Boeing (of which 150 for the MAX).

Wide-bodies

Looking at wide-body categories, the Airbus lineup includes the A330, the A340, the perennially loss-making superjumbo A380, and the A350 still under development.  Boeing’s competing lineup includes the aging but ever-updated 747, the 767, the new 787 ‘Dreamliner’, and most importantly today, the hugely successful 777. Stripping out single-aisle aircraft from 2011 orders, we see that Boeing secured 254 orders for wide-bodies and Airbus 193.

The 777 in particular now enjoys a quasi-monopoly in some segments, vindicating Boeing’s decision to develop this plane while Airbus exhausted itself on the prestige-minded A380 double-decker. Boeing delivered its 1,000th 777 to Emirates in March.  Airbus has positioned different versions of the upcoming A350 against both the 777 and the 787 Dreamliner. The A350 is years away from service but it now has a total of 548 orders. Recent cancellations by Abu Dhabi-based Etihad Airways have slowed down the momentum for the largest version A350-1000 which competes with the 777-300ER.

Airbus still loses an estimated €30+ million on each A380 that it builds but it expects the program to break even in 2014-15 on an EBIT pre R&D level, which is break-even on an operating level, ignoring much of the upfront investment.  That would place the EBIT break-even point somewhere between 200 and 250 unit deliveries (so far 72 A380s have been delivered).  In 2005, Airbus estimated the program would break even on an IRR basis at 270 units.  But in 2006, it revised the break-even point to at least 420 units.  The A380 now has 253 orders, two thirds of which have come from airlines based in emerging markets. And one airline, Dubai-based Emirates, accounts for 90 orders.

Airbus sees a total market of over 1,200 units for the A380 (all versions) in the next 20 years, but Boeing believes the potential market is only 325 units. Depending on where one stands on either end of this range, the A380 will either be handsomely profitable in a few years or one of the most visible financial failures in modern industry. For context, consider that in the 42 years since the introduction of the Boeing 747 in 1970, Boeing has sold nearly 1,500 versions of the plane.  With its A380 projections, Airbus is hoping to sell 80% as many units in as few as 20 to 25 years. It is true that the overall market is much bigger today but it is also true that airlines seem more interested in smaller planes. Rising world demographics do not necessarily create a correspondingly large demand for jumbo planes, as much as they do for a larger number of destinations and higher frequency of flights serviced by smaller aircraft.

It would be beneficial for both manufacturers if the A380 turned a profit (at least at EBIT level).  The plane has a list price of $375 million but list prices are generally above contracted prices.  Boeing’s revamped 747, the 747-8 Intercontinental, has a list price of $318 million. If the A380 stays in the red, the question becomes how long will Airbus continue to build it at a loss? Thousands of European jobs depend on the plane and Airbus will probably keep the program for as long as possible. Selling the A380 at a loss for an indefinite period would be detrimental to the Boeing 747-8’s own profitability if Airbus has to offer greater and greater discounts in order to keep the program alive.

It is still early in 2012 but both manufacturers have had difficulty selling wide-body aircraft this year.  Of Boeing’s 415 net orders, only 2 were for wide-bodies (there were 8 new orders and 6 cancellations). Of Airbus’ 95 net orders, only 6 were for wide-bodies (there were 22 new orders and 16 cancellations). The A350 has lost a net 7 orders in 2012. Boeing’s newest plane, the 787 Dreamliner lost a net 6 orders. However, both manufacturers have large backlogs, equivalent to 5 years of 2011 revenues at Boeing and to 11 years at Airbus, which should keep their factories humming in any downturn, barring large cancellations.

Profitability

Airbus is trying to improve its poor profitability.  Its EBIT margin in 2011 was a dismal 1.7% vs. 9.7% at Boeing’s Commercial Airplanes division. Airbus management is targeting an EBIT margin of 10% for 2015, a level last reached in 2005. The margin is expected to start expanding in 2012 as A380 losses subside and low-margin orders from the early 2000s are finally phased out.

By contrast, there may not be a lot of room for margin improvement at Boeing. Its group EBIT margin was 8.5% in 2011 and its margin in commercial planes was 9.7%.

Long-term expectations remain high and both manufacturers are likely to add more capacity in coming years. Because these expectations are predicated on continued growth in emerging markets, a cyclical downturn in these markets will depress utilization rates and put pressure on pricing at the same time that new competitors enter the lower end of the market. On the other hand, continued expansion of emerging market airlines and operational improvements at Airbus could result in better pricing power unless COMAC manages to gain significant market share.

In conclusion, both companies stand to benefit or suffer from emerging market developments. Operationally, Airbus has more room to improve. If it can narrow the margin gap with Boeing, EADS’s EV/Sales and stock should rise correspondingly. But its manufacturing location in Europe may make it difficult to reach its stated margin targets.

America Heading Towards Zero Population Growth?

The US population is growing at a declining rate and, without immigration, it will not grow at all in the 2030s and 2040s.

In the years following WW2 and until the mid 1960s, the US population grew by an average 1.6% per year.  From the late 60s to 2007, it grew by an average of 1% per year.  Since then, the growth rate has fallen under 1%. On my calculations, it will remain below 1% for several decades and will fall well below 0.5% in the 2030s and 2040s.  Without immigration, the size of the total population would flatline or shrink moderately in those decades.

Immigration has been and will continue to be a key component of growth for the US population, but immigration is seen by many as an addition to the organic growth of the existing population, when in reality it will be the only source of growth in the 2030s and 2040s when organic growth will be flat or negative.

This new reality was already visible in a recent report by the Census Bureau that showed the US population growing in 2011 at the lowest rate since 1940. It is a slowdown that will continue in the future as the number of boomer deaths rises steadily. For the next three decades, the number of deaths will be rising faster than the number of births.

The annual net addition to the population is the number of births minus the number of deaths plus the number of new immigrants. Every year, legal immigration adds about 1 to 1.1 million people to the US population. In the 2030-39 decade, on current trends, the number of births will match or fall slightly short of the number of deaths and the population will grow only due to immigration.

In order to quantify the growth of the population, we need to consider two main factors: First, how many births are likely in the coming years? Assuming the birth rate remains steady at 11 children per 100 women aged 20-40, there will be 4.2 million new babies in 2015, rising to 4.3 million in 2020, 4.4 million in 2030, 4.6 million in 2040 and 4.7 million in 2050.

Second, how many deaths will take place every year? This is a bit more difficult to predict because we need to quantify the number of Americans in each age segment today and to estimate the years of their deaths based on the life expectancy of each age. How many 40-year olds are alive today and what is the likely year of their passing? How many 41-year olds, 42 year-olds etc? For example, we estimate from US Census data that there are today 4.5 million Americans aged 50. Their life expectancy according to the Center for Disease Control is 31 years. A crude conclusion therefore would be to estimate that there will be 4.5 million deaths in 2043, excluding any deaths in that year of immigrants and their children who will have come to the US in the intervening years 2012-2043. (Obviously, not all people aged 50 today will pass in 2043, but there will be in that year additional deaths from people who are now in their 40s or 50s.)

Using this approach for every age, we estimate that the number of annual births in 2015-19 will approximate 4.2 million and the number of deaths 2.6 million, yielding an annual addition of 1.6 million to the US population. Adding 1 million more people to account for new immigrants yields a net annual addition of 2.6 million, a number which is consistent with the 2.8 million addition just announced by the Census Bureau for the period from April 2010 to July 2011. Immigration only added 703,000 people in 2011 because of the sluggish economy. A 1 million annual addition from immigration is therefore predicated on a stronger economic recovery.

The number of births fell steadily between 1921 and 1933 and did not fully recover until 1943. The dip in the 1920s and early 30s explains why the number of deaths has stagnated at around 2.4 million annually in the decade since 2000. But the subsequent recovery in births in the late 30s and in the baby boom years means that the number of annual deaths will also pick up in the remainder of this decade and in the 2020s.

Absent major changes in life expectancy and without the effect of future immigration, we estimate that there will be 31 million US deaths in the 2020-29 decade or 3.1 million per year, 46 million deaths in the 2030-39 decade or 4.6 million per year, and 48 million deaths in the 2040-49 decade or 4.8 million per year. Because the number of births will grow more slowly, the net annual additions to the population will fall from 2.6 million in 2015-19 (including immigration), to 2.3 million per year in 2020-29, to 0.9 million in 2030-39, to 0.8 million in 2040-49. In these last two decades, the number of births will be less than the number of deaths, which means that all of the US population growth will come from immigration. This analysis assumes no major changes in life expectancy, a stable birth rate, and annual immigration of 1 million newcomers.

Illegal immigration is not factored in any of these figures, but its impact is likely to be negligible unless the numbers turn out to be greater than currently estimated.

The economic consequences of declining population growth are likely to be far reaching. Many sectors of the economy which have been conditioned to expect higher population growth will be negatively impacted. These include housing, retail, travel and a host of others which have benefited for years from annual population growth of 1% or more and which will have to adapt to growth of less than 0.5% for a couple of decades. Some sectors may experience additional pressures from even lower (or even negative) growth in their target demographic segments. Manufacturers of finished goods should fare better since they can make up the slack in domestic demand by selling more abroad.

Risk factors to this thesis:

It is always risky to extrapolate current trends in a linear way. Many factors could intervene to mitigate or disprove the thesis here. For example, America could have another baby boom which would raise the birth rate from 11 children per 100 women aged 20-40 (assumed here) to 15. That alone would add 1.5 million annual births. But note that even in this extreme case, population growth would still be below 1% in the 2030s and 2040s. Another possibility is a big leap in life expectancy. Yet another is a greater number of immigrants in future decades after the economy recovers. Although any of these are possible, they are in my view less likely than the base case I presented above.

Portfolio 002 – Poor Demographics Point to Higher Gold Price

Initially published at Seeking Alpha on Thursday, July 2, 2009.

The question about owning gold should not be ‘why’ but ‘how much’. At the very least, gold should be considered a form of insurance against either financial collapse or rising inflation. It is pointless therefore to ask ‘why’ if you generally believe in the merits of owning insurance on anything. You don’t buy insurance for your house as an investment, but as a hedge against the low-probability scenario of it burning down or being destroyed by a hurricane or flood.

The only caveat to this analogy is if you don’t believe gold is a suitable form of insurance. But then what is? One scenario where gold may fail the test would be a deflationary economy. However, considering the amount of pump-priming that central banks are engaged in, the likelihood of deflation has receded compared to six months ago. Furthermore, the scenario of a Japanese-style deflation is unlikely for the American economy because our financial system (unlike Japan’s) is hard-wired to domestic economic growth and any deflation would quickly result in renewed systemic stress which would in turn lead to more investors buying gold.

The market recovery since March has alleviated many concerns, but only the most optimistic analysts would say today that the economy is out of the woods. To the rest of us, the risks of either another bout of systemic distress or of accelerating inflation are very real. In light of the steps taken by the Obama administration and by the Fed, the greater of the two risks is now that of accelerating inflation. The economy will likely see rising prices brought about by the very large government budget deficits and by a weakening dollar.

Underlying this picture is the overall demographic picture of the United States. Starting in 2005, and for the first time in 30 years, the size of the most economically active population (the 30 to 60 year-old segment) is stagnant at around 121 million souls. Between 1975 and 2005, this segment grew every single year, from 87 million to 121 million, contributing to economic growth. Due to a decline of the birth rate in the past thirty years relative to the preceding thirty, we are now in the fourth year of a fifteen-year period (2005 to 2020) when this segment will flatline at 121 million. The last period which saw the size of this bracket stagnate was the 1970s when the 30-to-60 group remained at 89 million (dipping to 87 million in 1974-75).

(If we redefine the most active bracket as the 25 to 67 year olds (instead of 30 to 60), the size of that bracket will continue to grow until 2017, which is good news for a resumption of GDP growth. However, the weakening of the economy since 2007 suggests that the inflection point has already been passed and that we should focus on the narrower 30 to 60 bracket. Most people who are younger than 30 don’t have a lot of money to spend and most people over 60 cut back on their spending.)

This suggests that the assumptions of economic growth for 2010-11 and beyond made by the Fed and the Treasury will prove too optimistic if they are premised on a demographic context such as we have seen in the last three decades. Lower-than-expected growth will mean lower tax receipts and greater demand for subsidized services, making it difficult to reduce the budget deficit. The bond vigilantes are already back in action and we can expect long-term rates to rise, the dollar to weaken and inflation to accelerate. It is very likely that gold will break through its March 2008 high and that it will see a price of $1,500 or even $2,000 per ounce before the Presidential election of 2012.

While its overall effects on the economy are clearly negative, inflation has one benefit which is to reduce the burden of excessive debt. Rising wages mean that households with fixed-term debt (fixed-rate mortgages, credit-card debt, etc.) will service that debt more easily since monthly payments will be falling in real terms. And real estate prices would see a recovery, though probably only in nominal terms. The same is true at the national level with rising inflation reducing the debt and entitlements burdens borne by the Federal and state governments, but also damaging in the process many social services as well as our relationships with our country’s creditors.