Peak Child: The Number of Children Aged Under 5

According to the UN, the global number of children aged under 5 has already peaked and is likely to fall for the rest of the century. But the number in sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow until 2070.

Note: This article first appeared in The Wednesday Letter 206 earlier this month. Please subscribe to the substack to receive all Wednesday Letter postings including Geopolitics on Mondays and Twelve Charts This Week on Fridays.

How many children aged under 5 are there in the world? And is that number growing or falling? According to the UN’s “medium variant” estimate, it rose until 2017 when it reached 690.4 million, and has been falling ever since. The late Hans Rosling called this ‘Peak Child’.

The UN has several demographic scenarios for the future. The most probable is what it calls the “medium variant”. There are also, among many more, a “high variant” and a “low variant” derived from assumptions of higher and lower fertility. Here, in the first chart, is the global number of children aged under 5, with each of the three variants. According to the most probable scenario (the medium variant), that number will more or less flatline above 650 million until 2060 after which it will fade down gradually to 560 million in 2100. The less probable high and low variants are also shown, with the first racing to nearly 1.1 billion and the second falling to 250 million by 2100.

It is important to underscore that all three variants assume a continuing decline in fertility (the number of children per woman) around the world, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa where it remains elevated. Here is the same chart for sub-Saharan Africa. Under all three variants, the number of children aged under 5 will continue to grow until at least 2050 (low variant), 2070 (medium) or beyond 2100 (high). The numbers themselves are quite large, 185 million today, and 250 million in 2070 per the medium variant.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the most demographically dynamic region of the world. Europe is the least dynamic. Here is the chart for Europe. The number of children aged under 5 peaked in 1962. Note the big dip in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union. European fertility has been well below replacement for a long time, which means that both the overall population and the working-age population will shrink. This retrenchment is not all due to Eastern Europe. The rest of Europe is also in demographic decline. The numbers are relatively small, 35 million children under 5 today and 25 million by 2100 per the medium variant.

Now here is something to make you pause. If we take the last two charts and combine them in a ratio of sub-Saharan to European children aged under 5, we see that this ratio (the number of sub-Saharan children under 5 for every European) rose from less than 1 to 1 in 1950 to 5.3 to 1 in 2023. Under the medium variants for both regions, it is expected to rise to 7.6 by 2050 and 9 by 2075. The consequences of this change will be significant. We are seeing them already with increased migration numbers from south to north.

If you are wondering about North America (includes the US and Canada but not Mexico), here is the chart. The number will remain essentially flat between 20 and 22 million. However, this does not account sufficiently for illegal immigration. It is likely that the number of children aged under 5 will rise to above 25 million in some future years. All the same, North America numbers are small compared to the boom that is taking place in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia.

China After the Dividend

This article is the second in a series and was published at Exante Data’s Money Inside and Out. Read the first of the series, How China Realized a Demographic Dividend.

Will it overcome its demographic decline?

In a recent post, we described China’s unprecedented success at realizing a demographic dividend starting in the 1990s until around 2010. We discussed the confluence of factors that made this dividend possible. In this post, we look at present conditions and try to discern what is in store for the future. We use our usual approach and look at the three main pillars of wealth creation: Demographics & HealthInnovation & ProductivitySociety & Governance.

Demographics & Health

The first thing that is evident is that demographics is no longer a positive vector of economic growth. 

The tailwinds created by a falling dependency ratio have died down and are now expected to turn into headwinds (see chart in our first post). The dependency ratio fell between 1970 and 2010 and was a key driver in the country’s GDP acceleration in that it opened a window of opportunity to realize a demographic dividend. China was able to realize that dividend because 1) it had liberalized its economy and opened up to trading with the world, and 2) it had improved its levels of education and infrastructure. As things stand today, the dividend has been fully realized and is behind us. There is instead a risk of a reverse demographic dividend, in which deteriorating demographics create a drag on growth, if China is unable to implement counteracting measures.

This risk is illustrated in the first chart below which shows the Chinese population by age groups. The population aged 15 to 64, aka the working-age population, soared between 1965 and 2015 and is now set to decline, slowly for the next decade but more rapidly thereafter. Meanwhile the population aged 65 and over will more than double between now and 2055. Finally, the youngest group aged 0-14 will taper off for decades to come.

Using the same data, the next chart shows the difference between the number of workers (those aged 15 to 64) and the number of dependents (those aged less than 15 and more than 64). The coming decline is as dramatic as the rise was in past decades. In 2015, there were 636 million more workers than dependents. But by 2055, this figure will fall to 189 million, or about the same as in 1980. Yet during this period, 1980-2055, the total Chinese population will have grown from 1 billion to 1.37 billion. (See in this article how the working-age population of other countries will have evolved between 1960 and 2050).

In addition to the longer term rise in the dependency ratio, China is seeing more recently a decline in its birth rate. China’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell to 1.09 children per woman in 2022, a new low in a recent downtrend that started after 2017. The next chart shows the evolution of the TFR since 1950. Note that it had fallen from over 6.0 to 2.75 before China enacted its one-child policy in 1980. Between 1991 and 2019, the TFR hovered between 1.5 and 2.0 but it fell below 1.5 in 2020 and fell again in 2021 and 2022.

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How to Tax a Billionaire (or Not)

Our institutions created centibillionaires and are now trying to contain them.

In Ayn Rand’s novel Atlas Shrugged, a group of high-achieving industrialists have had enough with being exploited (in their view) by “parasitic” collectivists and “second-handers”. They withdraw to a perfect community Galt’s Gulch aka Atlantis where they can live in peace and prosperity with each other, far away from the do-nothing (in their view) populace and according to their own laws and beliefs.

Because Rand mercifully never wrote a sequel (the original has more words than either War and Peace or Les Misérables), it is not clear whether these supermen and women lived happily ever after or whether, after enjoying the initial high of sticking it to humanity, their infinite egos led them to devour each other to oblivion and Galt’s Gulch disappeared Roanoke-like with no explanation left for posterity. That is, no explanation other than the obvious which is that a healthy society requires a fuller range of social strata and cultures, not only a super-stratum and a monoculture, in order to survive and to prosper.

No escape to Galt’s Gulch is currently offered to today’s billionaires who have so far opted to remain in the real world though they contend daily with insults and attacks from many quarters. It is necessary to say “so far” because some have been toying with otherworldly escapes, be they monetary via cryptocurrencies or interplanetary via emigration to planet Mars. Cryptos would free them from the gravity of central banks. And space from the gravity of Earth. After all, in our culture, “to leave it all behind” is nearly synonymous with high quality living. And to disrupt, to reject the dominant paradigm, are seen as ways to create new wealth.

Bernie vs. Billionaires

While still among us on earth however, even the ultra rich deserve… empathy. Or at least some recognition for their achievements. Their defining characteristic, shorn of all social and economic artifice, remains their humanity, not their wealth. Yet it is assumed by the angry-egalitarian political complex that it is fine to insult and harass a billionaire, as if their humanity was inversely proportional to their wealth. Starting with Bernie Sanders for example, some members of Congress have stated plainly that “billionaires should not exist”.

Because there are among the people mob inciters who amplify their message through social media, this slogan could be interpreted as incendiary, or as unsafely ambiguous. Does ‘billionaires should not exist’ mean that we should tax them until they are no longer billionaires? That would entail taking away 99% of some billionaires’ wealth. Or does it mean that we should limit their growth plans when their wealth hits the $999 million mark? Or force them to give away their wealth to charity? Or something else?

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Update: Working Age Population Around the World 1960-2050

This is an update of a similar post from 2015. The UN projections have changed but only by small numbers. The main observations are the same as six years ago (click table to enlarge in a new tab).

The working age population (WAP, those aged 15 to 64) of sub-Saharan Africa continues to grow rapidly. It has more than doubled since 1990 from 252 million to 609 million, and is expected to more than double again by 2050 to 1.3 billion. If the reality turns out to be anywhere near these projections, it will be a significant challenge for African economies to absorb and to employ productively this enormous amount of new human energy.

India faces a similar challenge with its WAP growing from 928 million now to 1.1 billion in 2050. Though daunting, this represents a slowdown in the rate of growth from the previous thirty-year span 1990-2020.

The WAP of Europe, China and Japan have already peaked and will be declining for the rest of the century, per UN projections. Europe’s decline from near 500 million in 2005 to a projected 407 million by 2050 is mainly due to eastern and southern Europe. The WAP of France and the United Kingdom will flatline to 2050 while those of Germany and Russia decline.

In the United States, the steady growth in the WAP between 1960 and 2005 combined with a falling dependency ratio to fuel strong economic conditions. Growth in the WAP is expected to be more muted in the decades ahead.

Compared to the late 20th century and the first decades of this century, the future growth in the WAP will taper off or even turn negative in several regions and countries. Sub-Saharan Africa stands out as the exception that will maintain strong WAP momentum through at least 2050.

You Are What You Risk, With Michele Wucker, 19 April 2021

“For some people, risk is scary and dangerous, and means peril and loss. For others, it means risk assets and they have to pile on because they just see the upside. But risk is actually value-neutral. It is important to be aware of the bias that you bring to things. Do you see both sides and do you weigh them? Or are you likely to overweigh the downside or overweigh the upside?” ________ Michele Wucker

We all have an ambivalent attitude towards risk. In 1850, a young Emily Dickinson wrote to her friend Abiah Root “the shore is safer, Abiah, but I love to buffet the sea. I can count the bitter wrecks here in these pleasant waters, and hear the murmuring winds, but oh, I love the danger!”

In her new book You Are What You Risk, author and strategist Michele Wucker codifies this ambivalence to risk. In this podcast with Sami, Michele explains the concepts of “risk fingerprint” and “personal risk portfolio”, among others.

Topics include:

  • 0:00 Introduction of Michele Wucker
  • 2:13 Thesis of ‘You Are What You Risk’
  • 5:20 Attitude towards risk: innate vs. acquired through experience
  • 10:40 Taking a risk vs. following a path; Risk and entrepreneurship
  • 14:10 About each person’s risk fingerprint
  • 19:45 Taking risk as the only woman in the room
  • 24:40 “Risk is value-neutral”
  • 33:00 Matching risk fingerprints in interactions; Measuring risk
  • 38:20 The personal risk portfolio
  • 42:25 Remembering the onset of the pandemic as a gray rhino

TO HEAR THE PODCAST, CLICK HERE OR ON THE TIMELINE BELOW:

(photo of Michele Wucker by Hal Shipman)

The Boom in Certainty

Sinclair Lewis called it “the sedate pomposity of the commercialist”. Now it has spread to many parts of society, not always in its sedate form.

Back in our final days as architecture students in Austin, our class had a farewell gathering with a professor who had been a valued mentor to several of us. As was habitual on such occasions, the professor was discussing with us the work of various architects when the subject of a newly-constructed building came up.

“I hate that building”, one classmate said flatly.

After an awkward silence, the professor mocked: “you mean, strongly dislike?” Off guard, the offending party protested that his use of the word was innocuous then and there. The professor conceded as much but explained that it was a visceral word, the kind of word that forestalls further discussion and that hardens the speaker’s and listener’s opinions. It is difficult to walk back or to change your mind from “hate”, and easier to do so from “dislike” or even from “strongly dislike”, he argued. His advice was to leave in one’s words an open path for retreat, in essence to never burn one’s rhetorical bridges.

This led to another discussion about certainty and about people who speak with certainty. The professor said that he had a reflexive dislike for certainty and that he felt a profound distrust towards people who speak with certainty. There is very little that is certain in life, he said, even among things of which we are convinced at a given point in time. Opinions change, science changes, research advances. New discoveries change our beliefs. Knowledge doesn’t just flow or evolve gradually like a river; it shifts laterally and sometimes suddenly like an earthquake.

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Florida in the Election

A French version of this article appears in L’Express.

Former mayor Mike Bloomberg has announced that he would spend as much as $100 million of his own money to help Vice-President Biden prevail in Florida on Election Day. This underscores once again the importance of Florida in this and every presidential contest.

Florida has a good track record of picking the winner in a presidential election. With the messy 2000 contest between George W. Bush and Al Gore, the state gained prominence as the ultimate prize and must-win battleground. To be sure, it is not a perfect track record, given that Florida favored George H. W. Bush in 1992 and Richard Nixon in 1960 over winners Bill Clinton and John Kennedy. If you go to earlier times, you also find that Floridians misfired with John Davis and James Cox in 1924 and 1920, two unknowns today except among aficionados of electoral history. But in sum, four misses out of 25 elections over a century can indeed be called a strong track record.

The stakes are high in 2020 given the state’s 29 Electoral College votes and the tightness of the race according to the polls. Vice President Biden is now nominally ahead by 1 to 3%, an insignificant gap that can easily close or widen in the remaining days of the campaign, depending on a slew of factors, not least the performance of each candidate in the upcoming debates.

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